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discuss outcomes for price and output. I will also
compare agriculture briefly with computer manu-
facturing, another industry characterized by rapid
productivity growth and falling prices.
Only after discussing the fundamentals of
agriculture will I get to monetary policy. My main
message is this: The Federal Reserve needs to
concentrate on its primary responsibility of keep-
ing inflation low and stable. Achieving sustained
low inflation requires that interest rates sometimes
rise and sometimes fall. I know that interest rate
fluctuations can cause problems in agriculture.
But there is no other known way to keep inflation
low and stable; furthermore, compromising mone-
tary policy objectives will not in the end help
agriculture, but will actually make things worse
by generating instability in the inflation rate,
interest rates, and the level of economic activity.
INCOME VOLATILITY IN
AGRICULTURE
As nearly everyone knows—including every-
one without exception in this audience—the
United States is currently in the midst of a record-
breaking business expansion: 107 months and
counting. Nearly as remarkable, the current expan-
sion follows on the heels of the 92-month-long
expansion in 1982-90. Moreover, the two expan-
sions were separated by one of the mildest reces-
sions in U.S. history. Professor John Taylor, a
distinguished economist at Stanford University,
has dubbed the 17-year period since 1982 “The
Long Boom.” Since 1982, the output of U.S. final
goods and services—or real GDP—has nearly
I
was delighted when Bert Greenwalt invited
me to speak at this conference. The topic
of the impact of monetary policy on agri-
culture is an old one, and one subject to a
lot of misinformation. Most of my speech will
be about the nonmonetary influences shaping
the industry. The reason is not that I’m dodging
the issue, but that most of what goes on in agri-
culture has nothing to do with monetary policy.
By discussing the fundamental forces shaping
the industry, I hope to convince you that most of
what we observe in the behavior of agricultural
prices and output is a consequence of nonmone-
tary forces. My main message is that trying to
change these outcomes through monetary policy
is an invitation to messing up monetary policy
without fixing problems in agriculture. In fact,
messing up monetary policy will only make
agricultural conditions more difficult.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. Kevin Kliesen of the St. Louis
Fed is a co-author of this speech. I appreciate his
contribution and thank other colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. However, I retain full responsibility for
errors.
I’m going to proceed in the only way a former
professor of economics can proceed—by organiz-
ing my remarks around the supply and demand
conditions in agriculture. I’ll start with a few facts
about income volatility in agriculture, before
moving on to analyze supply and then demand
conditions. Next, I will put the two together todoubled, growing at an average annual rate of
almost 3¾ percent per year.
I believe that improved monetary policy has
played an important role, though certainly not
the only role, in achieving this long period of
sustained economic growth at a healthy pace.
Whatever else might have been going on, the rate
of CPI inflation could not have declined from more
than 13 percent in 1980 to 2.7 percent over the
12 months ending December of last year if the
Federal Reserve had not concentrated its efforts
on controlling inflation. By sharply reducing the
rate of price inflation and establishing firm expec-
tations in the marketplace that inflation would
remain low, monetary policy has contributed to
higher productivity growth and enhanced the
economy’s stability.
Even though the U.S. unemployment rate
has fallen from about 11 percent at the end of
1982 to 4 percent today, we know that some mem-
bers of our society have been left behind. I suspect
that many in this audience will respond to these
words by thinking, “Yes, many of us in agriculture
have been left behind.” Indeed, the last couple
of years have been rough for U.S. agriculture.
Agriculture has always been a risky and uncer-
tain business. In ancient times, farmers suffered
from droughts and locusts. Today, farmers still
suffer from droughts and locusts. I don’t know
my ancient history very well, but I suspect that
several thousand years ago farmers suffered not
only from natural hazards but also from market
disruptions brought on by war, the edicts of
emperors, and other man-made problems. I’ll
leave it to you to tell me if farmers today feel any
better knowing their kinship with all farmers
over all ages and all parts of the world.
Let’s take a minute to look at some recent data
for U.S. farmers and ranchers. After rising to a 21-
year high of $54.9 billion in 1996, real, or inflation-
adjusted, net farm income subsequently fell 13
percent in 1997 and roughly another 10½ percent
in 1998. Although the latest projections from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) suggest
that some improvement occurred in 1999, this
upswing will most likely have stemmed entirely
from a nearly $11 billion jump in government
income transfers to farmers. For a longer-term
perspective, consider that real net farm income
averaged $47.7 billion between 1990 and 1998,
roughly 20 percent more than the $39.8 billion
annual average seen during the 1980s.
The early 1990s, then, were not so bad, but
farm income during those years pales next to the
$62.6 billion average real net farm income during
the 1970s. The tumultuous 1970s, frankly, were
an unusual decade. Some of agriculture’s good
fortune of that period was purchased at the cost
of severe problems in the 1980s. Although farm
incomes during the 1970s rose rather sharply for
a few years—real net farm income jumped from
$52 billion in 1971 to $108 billion only two years
later—this surge was the result of several unsus-
tainable factors, such as the United States allowing
the Soviets to enter the U.S. market to buy every
bushel of corn, wheat, and soybeans they could
get their hands on. But by 1980, against the back-
drop of high and rising inflation, high and rising
interest rates, and a depreciating dollar, real farm
income had plummeted to $29 billion. Just three
years later, it plunged another 27 percent to $21
billion. By 1983, real net farm income was more
than 80 percent lower than it had been just a
decade earlier and even lower than the $25 bil-
lion low point reached during the depths of the
Depression in 1932.
Many specific factors accounted for the sharp
swings in farm income I’ve outlined. These have
been well documented and I won’t repeat them
here. My point is merely to state that farming is
an inherently risky business. Swings in farm
incomes over time can be, have been, and proba-
bly will continue to be quite dramatic.
What I’m going to do now is to analyze the
basic characteristics of agricultural product mar-
kets; then I’ll discuss the role of monetary policy.
I’ll examine supply conditions first, then demand
conditions, and finally the interaction of supply
and demand that determines prices and quantities
of agricultural products.
MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION
2SUPPLY CONDITIONS IN
AGRICULTURE
In terms of sheer producing power per unit of
input, American agriculture ranks as an unquali-
fied success. The average U.S. farmer is growing
and harvesting more now than he has at any time
in history—and he’s doing it, in the aggregate,
with fewer inputs. Indeed, for 100 years or more,
U.S. agriculture has been characterized by fantas-
tic productivity advances. A closer look at this
productivity explosion reveals some startling
statistics. During the past 75 years, the number
of acres harvested for corn grain has declined by
16 percent while production has increased five-
fold. Similarly, while cotton production in recent
years is little changed from 1926, when cotton
acreage peaked at just under 45 million acres,
yields per acre have more than tripled while the
number of acres harvested has fallen by more than
two-thirds. And it’s not just crop producers who
have become more productive. The number of
cattle and calves peaked at around 132 million in
1975. Since then, the cattle inventory has dropped
by about a quarter while meat production has
increased 11½ percent. Likewise, the number of
pounds per broiler produced has risen from
roughly three in 1950 to nearly five today.
In the aggregate, accordingly, the amount of
output produced by each farmer, including farm
employees, has risen from almost $2,300 in 1910
to roughly $35,600 in 1998—or a little more than
3 percent a year. (These figures, including the
real net farm income measure cited earlier, are in
constant dollars, with a base year of 1996.) Much
of this increase has occurred since 1973, a period
when productivity in the nonfarm sector began
to slow dramatically. From 1973 to 1998, the
amount of farm output per worker rose at an
average annual rate of nearly 5 percent per year.
In contrast, the productivity growth in the nonfarm
business sector during this period measured 1½
percent a year.
That the industry has been able to increase
production with fewer farmers and ranchers is
testament to the tremendous benefits gleaned from
technological innovations. Doane’s Agricultural
Report, a trade publication many of you are
undoubtedly familiar with, recently ranked those
innovations that have contributed to agricul-
ture’s tremendous productivity advances during
the 20th century. In Doane’s view, research and
education, mechanization, hybrid seed corn,
commercial fertilizers, and chemical pesticides
were the top five improvements. Most economists
would probably concur with these assessments.
But just as the new technologies associated with
the computer, the Internet, lasers, and telecom-
munications have revolutionized many aspects
of the nonagricultural economy, more innovations
are on the way which, if developed properly,
promise even greater advances in agricultural
productivity in the future.
The advent of genetically modified organisms
in many crops, which follows the advances in
genetic improvements applied to livestock pro-
duction, promises both increased production and
reduced reliance on pesticides. Likewise, the use
of satellite technology to better apportion fertilizer
and other soil nutrients, combined with the
increased usage of low-till farming, offer the
promise of increased production with reduced
chemical fertilizer applications.
Some of these technological innovations are
controversial—no doubt about it. But these con-
troversies are a whole other subject. What I want
to emphasize here today is that productivity
improvement in agriculture is a great American
triumph, and understanding it is essential to
understanding the basics of agricultural markets.
If I had a chalkboard behind me, I would
summarize this discussion by drawing the usual
upward-sloping supply curve with a big arrow on
it, pointing to the right, to indicate that the entire
supply curve is shifting out rapidly over time as
productivity improvements accumulate. I would
also draw a couple of dashed supply curves par-
allel to the solid one to indicate that supply
bounces around from year to year depending on
growing conditions—the droughts and the locusts.
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AGRICULTURE
When you add a demand curve into the dia-
gram, the curve, of course, slopes down. But how
steep is it and how does it move over time?
Let’s start with the movement over time. The
demand for food rises as the population rises and
as the average income of consumers rises. The
effect of rising income has been understood for a
long time. In the mid-19th century, Prussian
economist Ernst Engel put forth the proposition
that the more income you have, the smaller the
fraction of your income spent on food. This propo-
sition was so well established that it became
known as “Engel’s law.” The demand for food
products increases about proportionately with
population, but beyond that increases more slowly
than does per capita income. For example, if per
capita income rises by 3 percent in real terms, the
percentage increase in demand for food products
would be considerably less—perhaps only 1 per-
cent. In the United States and other high-income
countries, we observe the consistent pattern that
expenditures on farm commodities grow more
slowly than total expenditures. Thus, expenditures
on farm commodities decline relative to the econ-
omy as a whole. For a long-term perspective,
expenditures on food as a share of total consump-
tion expenditures fell from about 25 percent in
1929 to 14 percent by 1999.
The market for U.S. agricultural production
is not, of course, limited to U.S. consumers. The
United States, by virtue of its abundant natural
resources and plentiful supply of capital, enjoys
a distinct comparative advantage in agriculture
production relative to most other countries. Given
the limited upside to boosting the domestic
demand for farm products, one way to increase
sales of U.S. farm products is to make them avail-
able to consumers in other parts of the world. And
in fact, the share of U.S. farm production that is
exported has steadily trended up over time. From
1935 to 1954, U.S. farm exports averaged 8½
percent of total farm output. This share reached
a high of 28 percent in 1980 and has averaged
roughly 25 percent since 1988. As important as
exports are to U.S. producers, the reality is that
food demand around the world is subject to
Engel’s law, which means that world demand for
U.S. farm output is unlikely to grow rapidly. More-
over, as the recent Asian crisis showed, unex-
pected demand disturbances from foreign
markets are a fact of life. It is probably true that
export demand, welcome though it certainly is,
is more volatile than domestic demand.
What about the shape of the demand curve
for food? This analysis can be very brief. We don’t
consume very much more food when its price
declines, or very much less when its price
increases. Thus, the demand curve is pretty
steep—inelastic, in economists’ lingo.
We can summarize the demand conditions
this way: The demand curve for agricultural
products is quite steep, shifts out only gradually
over time, and is somewhat volatile because export





In any market, price and quantity are deter-
mined by the interaction of supply and demand.
The long-run outcome in agriculture is dominated
by the fact that the supply curve, driven by rapid
productivity improvement, is shifting out more
rapidly than the demand curve. Thus, agricultural
prices relative to prices in general have been
trending down. Indeed, farm prices have been
falling relative to nonfarm prices for as long as
we can measure them. From 1909 to 1941, farm
price increases trailed aggregate price increases
by about ¾ of a percentage point a year. That mar-
gin doesn’t sound very large, but maintained for
30 years, it cuts the relative price of agricultural
prices by 21 percent. During World War II and its
immediate aftermath, farm prices shot up dramati-
cally: From 1941 to 1948, farm prices advanced
at roughly 14½ percent a year, while aggregate
prices rose a little more than 7½ percent a year.
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downward trend, as the waves of technological
innovations ramped up production. Although
U.S. living standards rose in the aftermath of
World War II, Engel’s law remained in force and
food demand grew relatively slowly. From 1948
to 1998, relative farm prices declined by roughly
3 percent a year; by 1998, the relative price of
food was 78 percent below its 1948 level. Falling
relative farm prices, in turn, caused farm income
to grow more slowly than nonfarm income.
Output has been growing in absolute terms,
but less rapidly than output of all goods taken
together. Modest output growth is a direct outcome
of the fact that the U.S. population has been pretty
well fed for a long time, and does not choose to
eat that much more even when the price of food
goes lower. The bottom line, in terms of long-term
trends, is that agricultural prices have been falling
and total output rising only modestly.
The inevitable outcome of rapid technological
advance and slow growth of total demand is that
the demand for workers in agriculture declines.
It seems somehow unfair that a particularly inno-
vative and productive sector such as agriculture
tends to generate low incomes. Indeed, income
prospects are especially bleak for those in agricul-
ture who fall behind the cutting edge of techno-
logical improvement. In the words of the
economist Hendrik Houthakker, “The greater the
increase in farm productivity, the greater the
imbalance between supply and demand of farm
products which has to be corrected by an outflow
of labor or by lower farm prices.” Moreover,
Houthakker notes that “unless the outflow of labor
from farming is fast enough, an increase in farm
productivity leads only to lower farm prices
and lower farm incomes.” How low incomes go
depends on how rapidly workers move out of
agriculture to industries with better income
prospects. Low incomes in agriculture may seem
unfair—and this analysis may seem rather brutal—
but the fact is that low incomes are driven by the
inexorable economic forces of high productivity
growth, slow demand growth, and insufficiently
rapid exit of workers from agriculture.
Let me put a few numbers into the analysis.
From 1910 to 1932, U.S. farm employment
declined modestly, from 13.6 million to 12.8 mil-
lion, or about 0.25 percent per year. During the
1930s, labor outflows accelerated markedly and
continued largely unabated until roughly 1987,
when farm employment totaled just under 3 mil-
lion, or about a quarter of what it was 50 years
earlier. In 1999, farm employment was about 2
percent of total employment, whereas in 1929
about one-fifth of civilian employees were
engaged in farm employment.
It appears that the major adjustment in the
number of agricultural workers is now over. Since
1987, farm employment has stabilized, and even
risen slightly. Of course, farm employment con-
tinues to fall as a share of total employment, but
the most difficult period in which a large absolute
decline occurred is now past.
According to the USDA, the index of total
farm output increased by roughly 135 percent
from 1948 to 1996 (the latest observation). Over
this period, though, the index of total farm input—
a measure designed to capture the influence of
intermediate inputs like fertilizer, fuel, labor and
capital—actually declined. What is interesting is
that nearly all of this decline in input stems from
reductions in labor input. Whereas inputs of inter-
mediate products rose 84 percent and capital input
rose 33 percent, labor input dropped 70 percent.
Although farm output has increased substan-
tially over time, it has not kept pace with growth
in the nonfarm sector of the economy. From 1889
to 1966, real farm output as a percent of total GDP
declined from nearly 8½ percent to about 1¼ per-
cent. Since then, it has remained fairly constant,
implying that the rate of return to agriculture has
more or less stabilized at its long run rate. The
continued existence of small, inefficient farms,
though, suggests that other factors are keeping
some resources in the industry that might well
earn a higher return elsewhere.
I’ve discussed long-run trends in agricultural
prices and outputs, and earlier I discussed the
volatility that characterizes this industry. Now I
need the image of a chalkboard in motion. The
supply and demand curves are dancing around,
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prices, and sometimes delightful increases in
prices—delightful for producers, anyway. The
dance sometimes yields painful declines in out-
put—the years of droughts and locusts—and
sometimes enormous bumper crops. And these
fluctuations occur on top of long-run trends




It is interesting to compare agriculture, just
briefly, with another industry—computers—
characterized by high productivity growth.
Though the two industries are vastly different in
terms of their output, the qualitative nature of
their labor input and the production processes
they employ, the computer and agriculture indus-
tries do share a couple of key characteristics. First,
the two are both capital intensive. Second, the
prices of their outputs continue to fall relative to
the prices of all other goods and services. In fact,
unlike farm prices, personal computer prices have
actually fallen in absolute terms since they entered
the marketplace. Since 1978, computer prices
have fallen by an average of 17 percent per year,
while prices for all output, as measured by the
GDP chain price deflator have risen by 3¾ percent
per year. Thus, the relative price of computers
has declined by more than 20 percent per year—
much more, recall, than the 3 percent per year
drop in relative agricultural commodity prices.
Why are computer firms getting rich while farmers
face the threat of bankruptcy?
In both agriculture and computer manufactur-
ing, supply conditions are dominated by rapid
productivity improvement. But demand condi-
tions in the two industries are very different. While
the demand for farm commodities is relatively
insensitive to price and income changes, the
demand for personal computers is not. The com-
puter demand curve on the imaginary chalkboard
behind me is shifting rapidly to the right, as
income rises, and has a relatively flat slope. Busi-
ness demand for computers is rising rapidly as
well because computers so enhance the produc-
tivity of production processes of all sorts of goods,
including agricultural goods.
Thus, rising real personal incomes and
increasing business use of computers propel the
computer demand curve outward, and declining
computer prices driven by the outward shift in
supply stimulates higher purchases as we slide
down the relatively flat demand curve. The out-
come is that computer production is exploding.
Since 1959, output of computer and office equip-
ment has increased at an average annual rate of
21 percent per year, whereas total factory output
and real GDP both rose only about 3½ percent per
year.
If only farmers could find a way to stimulate
demand for a bushel of corn on every desktop…




From time to time, every central bank finds
that it must change interest rates to maintain low
and steady inflation. Let’s take a moment to under-
stand why.
Suppose there were some way for the central
bank to achieve low inflation without acting
directly on interest rates. For example, suppose
the central bank controlled money growth
directly—indeed, there is an extensive literature
arguing that this policy is the one central banks
should pursue. The Federal Reserve might raise
and lower money growth as needed to achieve
its objective of low and steady inflation. Interest
rates would fluctuate freely in the marketplace.
Even when the Fed maintained rock steady money
growth, interest rates might rise or fall. In particu-
lar, when the economy boomed, rates would tend
to rise as households and firms bid for funds to
finance spending on new investment, on houses,
on cars, and all the other things people commonly
finance by borrowing. Similarly, when the econ-
omy slowed, interest rates would tend to fall,
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money growth.
That a strong economy tends to push interest
ratesupandaweakeconomytendstopushinterest
rates down is illustrated nicely by recent Japanese
experience. Most are aware that Japanese growth
has been somewhere between anemic and non-
existent for a good number of years—in fact, for
the whole of the decade of the 1990s. Interest rates
on short-term Japanese government securities
have been at or near zero percent for the last year,
and still the economy is stumbling along.
The Federal Reserve, along with almost all
other central banks, conducts monetary policy
by adjusting its target for the interest rate on
short-term interbank borrowing, known in the
United States as the federal funds rate. The Fed
calls this target the “intended federal funds rate.”
What the Fed tries to do is to mimic, in broad out-
line, how the federal funds rate would fluctuate
if the Fed could set the rate of inflation directly,
or through some other policy tool such as money
growth. If the Fed fails to adjust the intended
federal funds rate appropriately, it will fail in its
mission to achieve low and steady inflation.
When the Fed raises the intended federal
funds rate, other interest rates typically follow. In
fact, other rates not infrequently lead the intended
rate, as the market anticipates what the Fed is
going to do. Everyone who has borrowed funds
using short maturity loans and therefore expects
to pay higher rates on those borrowings in the
future, everyone in the process of borrowing funds,
and everyone thinking about borrowing in the
future feels hurt by the increase in interest rates.
And since almost everyone in the country either
has borrowed, is in the process of borrowing, or
expects to borrow in the future, that means that
there is almost universal pain when interest rates
rise.
But what is the choice? If interest rates don’t
rise in a timely fashion, then sooner or later
inflation will begin to rise. When that happens,
investors will put additional upward pressure
on interest rates, to protect their capital from
being eroded by inflation. So, a central bank that
delays raising rates does not in the end avoid rate
increases, but instead imposes both higher infla-
tion and, eventually, even higher interest rates
on society.
Because the lessons that flow from procrasti-
nation in monetary policy were learned so pain-
fully in the 1970s, and because Fed policy has
been so successful since 1982, when the inflation
of the 1970s was finally conquered, complaints
about periods during which interest rates rise
have been relatively muted. But I have to put the
emphasis on “relatively.”
When interest rates rise, farmers, agricultural
implement manufacturers and dealers, and other
related businesses often complain. So also do
home builders, whose industry is especially
interest sensitive. So do car manufacturers and
dealers, and many others.
Sometimes the argument is a bit different.
When agriculture, or any other industry, is going
through a difficult period, pleas for assistance are
understandable. Why can’t the Fed lower interest
rates a bit to help in such situations? For example,
when the Asian economic crisis hit in mid-1997,
U.S. agricultural exports were especially hard hit.
The crisis deepened in mid-1998 with the Russian
default. The Fed did lower interest rates in the
fall of 1998, to prevent the financial disruption
from spilling over to affect the stability of the
U.S. economy. As financial conditions returned
to normal last year, the Fed raised the intended
fed funds rate, and market rates rose as well. But
the effects of the Asian problems on the farm
economy lingered, and linger to this day.
Now, I’m not suggesting that Fed policy should
be unaccountable. Indeed, Fed policy should be
examined and reexamined continuously in vigor-
ous public debate, and it is. The Fed needs to
defend and explain its policy decisions, and I do
my best to contribute to that process.
Many people do not understand, however,
that as powerful as monetary policy is, a central
bank has essentially only one policy instrument.
I like to think of that instrument as the rate of
money growth—or, more generally, the provision
of liquidity to the economy—over the long run.
In the short run, the Fed implements its control
over the growth of liquidity by setting the intended
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ment, the central bank can at best achieve only
one policy objective. That objective is a low and
stable rate of inflation. If the Fed tries to pursue
other objectives, it may lose control over the rate
of inflation.
Our experience in the 1970s drove home with
stark clarity the consequences of losing control
over the rate of inflation. The economy suffered
from high and unstable interest rates, rapid
swings in the international value of the dollar,
and increased instability of employment and
output. The recessions of 1973-75 and 1981-82
were among the most severe downturns in U.S.
history. The instabilities of this period added to
the burdens suffered by agriculture, homebuilders,
and other industries.
The U.S. economy is dynamic and rapidly
changing. At any given time, certain industrial
and geographic sectors are bound to lag the over-
all economy, while others do better than the
overall economy. Monetary policy can do little
to help the lagging sectors—there are no policy
instruments at the Fed’s disposal that have sector-
specific effects. Our responsibility is to maintain
low and stable inflation and, to the extent possible
within this basic objective, to smooth temporary
disturbances.
A FINAL WORD
My message today is simple. U.S. agriculture
is a spectacular success story of high productivity
growth maintained over an amazingly long period
of time. Most U.S. success stories can be charac-
terized as enjoying a period of rapid growth and
innovation followed in a relatively few years by
a mature stage of slow growth. Think of railroads,
automobiles, and steel. U.S. agriculture, on the
other hand, is characterized even today by excit-
ing gains in productivity; it is not yet a mature
industry. Agriculture today suffers from the same
problems it has always suffered from: droughts,
locusts, and market disruptions. It is a risky enter-
prise, and I have great respect for those who cope
and prosper in this business.
The contribution monetary policy can make
to agriculture is to maintain low and steady infla-
tion. Those of you in agriculture should ask the
Fed to keep its eye on the inflation ball. Criticize
us when we are going off track, but define “off
track” by the economy as a whole and not by
conditions in agriculture alone. Do not underes-
timate the importance to agriculture of a stable
overall U.S. economy. Low inflation, stable infla-
tion expectations, relatively low interest rates on
the average, high and stable employment, all con-
tribute to stability of the agricultural economy.
The Fed can do nothing about the fundamental
economic forces controlling the destiny of agri-
culture: high productivity growth, the hazards of
nature, the low price and income elasticities of
demand, and the instability of conditions in
important export markets. But the Fed will do its
best to maintain a stable domestic economy. If
the Fed can continue to be successful in tempering
that important historical source of instability to
U.S. agriculture, the Fed will have done its job.
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